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Energy Security and Global Politics 
This book analyzes the strategic dimensions of energy security, particularly 
where energy resources may become the object of military competition. 
The volume explores the diverse risks that may arise from conditions of 
increasing economic competition and resource scarcity, and the full range of 
problems that may follow if major producers or consumers of energy lose confi-
dence in the equity and efficiency of the market, and resort instead to the use of 
force to secure access to energy. It surveys the strategic outlook of both pro-
ducer and consumer states, with emphasis on nations or regions (Central Asia, 
Russia, China, Venezuela, the Persian Gulf) where unstable or rapidly evolving 
political conditions may undem1ine the currently prevailing market consensus. It 
also examines the role of the United States as the chief guarantor of the global 
economy, and the challenge this unique role poses for its exercise of military 
power. The book contends that while the global energy market may be largely 
self-regulating, it is not self-defending. A failure to consider how it can be most 
effectively defended from emerging and potential challenges merely heightens 
the risk that those challenges may some day become real. 
This book will be of interest to students of energy policy, international secur-
ity, US foreign policy and international relations in general. 
Daniel Moran is Professor of International and Military History at the Naval 
Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, where he directs the doctoral 
program in Security Studies. James A. Russell is a senior lecturer in the Depart-
ment of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, 
California. 
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I I Introduction 
The militarization of energy security 
Daniel Moran and James A. Russell 
A series of strategy documents promulgated by the last three American adminis-
trations all note the decreasing prospect of large-scale interstate conflict. 1 It is 
becoming increasingly difficult to imagine realistic scenarios of conventional 
conflict along the lines of the world wars. Needless to say, this does not mean 
that violent conflict will cease to trouble the world community. Warfare associ-
ated with the fragmentation of states, clashes among warlords and other 
shadowy contestants for political and economic influence, and attempts by the 
developed world to suppress dangerous behavior by states operating outside 
accepted international norms - all remain familiar in the present, and likely in 
the future. 
There is no question that violence of this lesser and still familiar kind can 
imperil the stability of the international system as a whole. Yet it is able to do so 
only by virtue of the reactions it may inspire among the system's strongest 
members. In the final analysis a crisis among such states can only be brought 
about by their own actions. The only way for "rogue states" and "non-state 
actors" to achieve true strategic leverage is to induce the most powerful 
members of the system to act in ways that are self-defeating, even if they are not 
foreseen as such. 
It is also possible, of course, that states with a presumptively strong stake in 
preserving international order may conclude that the system no longer serves 
their interests, and that it is better to risk overturning it by force than to suffer a 
diminution of their role or prospects. Recent history suggests that the chances of 
such a miscalculation are not large, however. Since 1945 war has been fought 
exclusively by or against inferior powers and revolutionary insurgencies with 
limited military potential. Although the results have often been appalling in 
human terms, the impact of such violence on global order has been far below 
what would be expected of general war, or required to incite it. 
The Cold War provided many opportunities for the United States and the 
Soviet Union to fight each other. They never did, preferring instead to under-
write proxy wars conducted on terms calculated to limit the impact on the super-
powers' bilateral relationship. Even in its death throes the Soviet Union did not 
attempt to save itself by rolling the iron dice of war, an expedient well known 
among doomed regimes of the past. There is little doubt why this happened: the 
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world wars had demonstrated, beyond the illusions of even the mosi ideologi-
cally befuddled statesmen, that the consequences of modem war between 
advanced societies dwarf any prospective benefits. The spread of nuclear 
weapons has strongly reinforced this conclusion. 
This book does not seek to challenge the prevailing consensus that large-scale 
conflict among developed states has become unlikely. Its aim is rather to reflect 
upon conditions in the one area of international life where serious observers still 
regard it as possible: energy security. It is in the energy sector that strategic 
planners now find it easiest to imagine major states reconsidering their reluc-
tance to use force against each other. "Energy security" is now deemed so 
central to "national security" that threats to the former are liable to be reflexively 
interpreted as threats to the latter. In a world in which territorial disputes, ideo-
logical competition, ethnic irredentism, and even nuclear proliferation all seem 
capable of being normalized in ways that constrain the actual use of military 
force, a crisis in the global energy supply stands out as the last all-weather casus 
be/Ii when the moment comes to hypothesize worst-case scenarios. 
This is not a reason to assume that wars over energy are more likely now than 
in the past. Precisely because such conflicts have been limited and rare up to 
now,
1 there is good reason to be cautious about estimating their likelihood in the 
future. The probabilities are further muddled by the fact that over-emphasis on 
the possibilities for great-power conflict favors important, and generally 
conservative, institutional interests within the defense establishments of 
developed states, particularly the United States. In a security environment that 
presents increasingly strong incentives to shift force-structure and doctrine 
toward irregular warfare, counter-terrorism, constabulary operations, and so on, 
the possibility of war to seize or defend energy resources provides a much-
needed rationale for preserving the heavy conventional forces that still consume 
the lion's share of defense spending around the world. This is especially true of 
naval building programs, whose ostensible purpose is always presumed to 
include securing the sea-lines of communication that connect the producers and 
consumers of oil. 1 
The prominence of energy security to military planning and budgeting may 
be exaggerated compared to its real salience internationally. Yet the anxiety that 
this issue is capable of inspiring is itself a measure of its significance, irrespec-
tive of any estimate of the probabilities. There were only two world wars in the 
entire twentieth century, after all, yet that is scarcely a reason to discount their 
importance. The possibility that access to energy resources may become an 
object of large-scale armed struggle is almost incontestably the single most 
alarming prospect facing the international system today. The political stability of 
advanced societies, and the continued prospects for economic and social 
improvement in developing countries, are both irreducibly dependent on avoid-
ing such a conflict. 
Like all international markets, the market for energy is sensitive to war and 
upheaval, whatever the cause. Energy markets are efficient at discounting risk, 
and there is a long history of price spikes and shortages whenever political insta-
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bility and large-scale violence, chiefly but not exclusively in oil-producing 
regions, threatens established patterns of production and consumption. The 
world today is witnessing this time-honored phenomenon in reaction to the US 
invasion of Iraq, and to political turbulence in crucial producing states like 
Nigeria and Venezuela. Strategic planners in the United States and elsewhere are 
well aware of the degree to which the effect of military operations on the price 
and supply of oil and natural gas needs to be considered in their work; though 
the result is not necessarily improved clarity of vision. One of the early ratio-
nales advanced in favor of the US invasion of Iraq, after all, was that "regime 
change" there would allow Iraq to pump more oil, thereby reducing the depen-
dence of world markets on Saudi production, a sadly fanciful idea that shows no 
prospect of being realized any time soon. 
Nevertheless, issues of this kind are only a secondary concern of this volume. 
Its interest is less in the impact of international violence on energy supplies, than 
on the impact of changes in the supply of energy on patterns of international 
conflict and alignment, and on the strategic behavior that underlies these. This 
project does not seek to estimate the likelihood of a major strategic crisis arising 
in the energy sphere. It seeks instead to survey the range of considerations that 
might bring such a crisis about. Its concern is with the issues that may arise if 
control of energy resources, or the rights of buyers and sellers in the energy mar-
ketplace, become explicit objects or tools of strategic coercion, either by govern-
ments or by others who may be able to seize control of them. Energy resources 
may become casus belli in themselves; or they may be viewed as alternatives to 
the use of force by governments, who persuade themselves that wielding the 
"energy weapon" will somehow obviate or substitute for the use of real ones. 
Either way, the prospects for global order are sufficiently daunting to bear 
careful consideration. 
"Peak oil" 
Oil, which sits in the foreground of the global energy picture, is a finite resource. 
Much remains to be discovered about the ultimate extent of global petroleum 
reserves, and about the economics of their exploitation. In the final analysis, 
however, there is no disputing that the world's supply of oil must be depleted 
sooner or later. This fact casts its shadow over strategic calculations in the 
energy sphere. 
Experts disagree about when what has come to be called "peak oil" will 
arrive. 4 Some hold that it is already behind us - that we have already used up 
half of mankind's natural endowment of oil, and are on the downward slope of a 
curve whose theoretical bottom represents the absolute disappearance of oil as a 
natural resource. Most experts reject this idea, however, and in recent years esti-
mates of available reserves have pushed the hypothetical peak of oil farther into 
the future, generally beyond the 20- to 50-year horizon that constitutes the prac-
tical limit of even the most ambitious strategic planning. 
In reality the true moment of peak oil is likely to be apparent only in 
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retrospect. At the same time, its looming presence somewhere over history's 
horizon seems equally certain to be priced into the market before it actually 
arrives. The idea of peak oil is already becoming established as a subtext or 
unspoken assumption among strategists and policy-makers, and reinforces the 
tendency to see the energy sector as one in which particularly critical threats are 
liable to arise. In this sense the timing of peak oil is less significant than the stra-
tegic inferences that thinking about it and getting ready for it may inspire. 
Peak oil also has a derivative meaning that strategists must struggle to take 
into account. In theoretical terms peak oil means simply that oil ceases to be 
useable for present human purposes. The simplest reason for this would be that 
the world's supply of oil dries up - peak oil in its most immediate sense. But 
mankind might reach comparable conditions by a different avenue, should con-
ditions arise that cause all the environmental externalities associated with the 
use of carbon-based energy to get priced into the energy market. Energy markets 
in the industrial era have invariably failed to reflect the true immediate and long-
term social costs incurred by mankind's ferocious hunger for carbon-based 
fuels, costs that have only recently become apparent, and are now accumulating 
at a rapid rate. In the same way that estimates of world oil reserves have so far 
proven to be too pessimistic, estimates of measurable environmental effects 
linked to climate change have proven no less consistently optimistic. If the 
graph of peak oil has moved consistently "to the right" by virtue of the accumu-
lation of new scientific knowledge,5 the metrics of impending environmental 
crisis have all moved no less consistently "to the left" for the same reason.6 Even 
granting the significant uncertainty that prevails in both areas, it is easy enough 
to imagine a cross-over point at which the environment impacts of fossil-fuel 
consumption (a category that includes coal, biomass, and natural gas as well as 
oil) begin to register in strategic terms, so that a condition akin to "virtual peak 
oil" is reached well in advance of the real thing. 
From a market perspective there are risks on both sides of the peak-oil 
problem. A nation that preemptively abandons a petroleum-based economy 
before others do may incur additional short-term costs, as an early adopter of 
new and unproven technologies that place it at a disadvantage relative to com-
petitors that hold on longer to what is still cheap and familiar. A nation that 
waits too long may find itself paying premium prices for a commodity that has 
become too scarce to bum, but must be rationed for other, more specialized pur-
poses. The risks associated with "virtual" peak oil also include the possibility 
that states will attempt to coerce each other to reduce their consumption of fossil 
fuels (and the resulting carbon emissions), in effect redefining environmental 
pollution as a form of international delinquency, perhaps even as "aggression," 
toward which a strategic response is warranted. 
Trusting the market 
One reason that such seemingly remote anxieties have crept into the foreground 
of contemporary strategic thinking is uncertainty about whether such problems 
T 
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can be adequately addressed in the marketplace. The fact that strong states have 
been prepared to trust their energy security to the workings of international 
markets is testimony to their faith in the efficiency of those markets, and to their 
belief that the costs of war aimed at controlling energy resources would be so 
great as to outweigh the benefits. In these terms "trusting the market" has made 
profound strategic sense, and it may continue to do so indefinitely.7 
Yet it is important to recognize that the complexity of the problems the 
market is being trusted to solve is destined to increase. Until now energy 
markets have been expected to do no more than ensure that supply kept up with 
demand, and that prices remained within a range that buyers and sellers could 
tolerate. If it is true that oil may eventually become too expensive to use for 
energy on the current scale, whether because too scarce or too toxic, then the 
market must gradually learn to do more. It must drive the price of oil up at a rate 
that provides adequate incentives for the development of alternative fuels - a 
development that the producers of oil can be expected to use their market posi-
tion to resist. It must also do this at a rate that is sufficiently smooth as not to 
dislocate too severely established patterns of consumption in the developed 
world, nor thwart too severely the aspirations of those who hope to join that 
world some day. It must also proceed sufficiently rapidly to forestall the advent 
of "virtual" peak oil. 
Such would be the ideal market solution to the array of energy-related prob-
lems that currently confront mankind. It is, by any reckoning, the best-case sce-
nario; which may be reason enough not to cling to it too strongly. It certainly 
begs the question of what kinds of non-market strategies, if any, might be 
adopted to hedge against its failure to come to fruition. No one can say for sure 
whether this sort of juggling act is beyond the power of what Adam Smith called 
"the invisible hand." But it is most assuredly a more complicated trick than it 
has performed recently. 
The replacement of oil by other energy forms is nothing like the replacement 
of radio by television, owing to the complexities of the social arrangements and 
cultural attitudes that are necessarily arrayed around the way mankind consumes 
energy. The only comparable example is the Industrial Revolution itself, during 
which "the market" was asked to escort Western civilization across the rickety, 
fog-shrouded bridge that connected its agrarian, wood-fueled past to an indus-
trial, fossil-fueled future - a future in which the early advocates of free markets 
were sure the natural partnership of peace and prosperity would triumph over the 
mercantilist obscurantism of the past. That future may yet come. But it is not 
here yet. 
The militarization of energy security requires, in the first instance, that some-
thing must change that would cause major participants in the energy market to 
reject their well-grounded calculation that war for energy (or any merely eco-
nomic advantage) does not pay. High energy prices would be a likely, but prob-
ably not a sufficient, motivation for such a change. In addition, governments 
would have to believe that the normal mechanisms by which prices adjust to 
changes in supply and demand had broken down, or were on their way to doing 
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so. Prices in any market demonstrate three basic tendencies: short-term volatil-
ity, medium-term momentum, and long-tetm reversion to the mean. The 
meaning of these terms varies depending on what is being bought and sold, but 
their operation is apparent across an enormous range of economic phenomena. 
They represent, collectively, the self-modulating action of supply and demand, 
which is the economist's equivalent of the law of gravity. 
From the point of view of those who seek to make money in a marketplace, 
the first two tendencies - volatility and momentum - are of the greatest interest, 
since it is by mastering these that one has the best chance to "buy low, sell 
high." For strategists, however, it is "mean reversion" that matters most, because 
this longer-term mechanism provides reassurance during periods when volatility 
and momentum carry prices and supplies to uncomfortably high or low levels. In 
recent history, international acceptance of the now-irrelevant Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) price basket represented an attempt to 
manage mean reversion, by way of acknowledging the legitimate requirement of 
producing states that the price of their product be both reasonable and pre-
dictable. Mean reversion does not require that prices fluctuate in perpetuity 
around a flat line. On the contrary, the prospect of peak oil (real or "virtual") 
implies that mankind as a whole has a positive interest in getting the line to 
slope upward at a tolerable rate. But mean reversion does require that aggregate 
price movements describe a relatively smooth trend, whose variance is markedly 
less than that displayed by short- and mid-term price changes. 
Such relationships are no more than mathematical models, which can be cal-
culated in different ways. For our purpose it is not the precise calculation but the 
general idea that matters, and specifically the military and political con-
sequences that may follow if this general idea is abandoned. Oil prices have 
more than doubled in the last three years. This development is largely attribut-
able to military and political events that were not widely foreseen, and by no 
means inevitable. Having occurred, however, there is no assurance that prices 
will ever revert to the old mean. Before 2003 oil traders regarded $20 per barrel 
as the trend around which short-term volatility would revolve. Lately the con-
sensus has shifted closer to $40 or $50, an increase of 100 percent or more in the 
perceived trend in three years. Should this wave-like process of periodic doub-
ling continue at anything like a comparable pace in the future, it seems certain 
that questions about the market's ability to revert to historical norms will grow 
more urgent among the major consumer states.8 
What kinds of events or forces might cause governments to conclude that 
energy prices or supplies will not revert to their established trend? Whatever 
they may be, it is safe to say they need not be dramatic in themselves. It is most 
likely that the militarization of energy-resource management will occur as a 
series of small iterative calculations conceived in response to limited crises or 
opportunities, each of which will erode the willingness of other participants to 
trust the market going forward. To speak of militarization as a general phenome-
non it is necessary to imagine that such activity reaches a scale at which the 
normal operation of energy markets is compromised. The possibilities that 
r 
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matter need not entail catastrophe in themselves; but they must envision stra-
tegic intervention on a scale that is not incidental, and calls into question the 
future vitality of the market as a whole. A representative list of possibilities 
would include: 
Direct seizure of energy assets by military means. 
Destruction of energy assets to deny their use to rivals. 
Military confrontation arising from competitive efforts to exploit new 
energy resources on the high seas, where legal claims of sovereignty are 
absent; in archipelagic regions like Southeast Asia, where they are routinely 
contested; or in the Arctic and Antarctic, where they are subject to treaty 
regimes whose resilience has not been seriously tested. 
Indirect control of energy assets through the creation of puppet states. 
Military protection of, or attacks upon, the energy production and trans-
portation infrastructure, including oil fields, refineries, pipelines, port facili-
ties, and so on. 
Active military control of international straits through which energy assets 
move. 
Development of exclusive energy trading blocs, reminiscent of the systems 
of "imperial preference" that existed before 1945. 
Conveyance of major military assets to regional energy producers in 
exchange for preferential market treatment, or with a view to enabling them 
to impose themselves upon neighboring states. 
Most of the possibilities on this list are not strategically distinctive in them-
selves. Even those that are most obviously lamentable - the establishment of 
puppet regimes, or the transfer of military assets to potentially dangerous clients 
- are sufficiently familiar that they do not pose a prima facie threat to global 
stability. The unique problems that will arise from the militarization of energy 
resources only become apparent when these kinds of actions are envisioned as 
occurring in a context in which the stability of energy supplies is also recogniz-
ably at risk. 
In such circumstances the great difficulty, from the point of view of both 
analysis and action, is to account for the enormous range of secondary effects 
that may follow once force is used on a significant scale. It must be assumed, for 
instance, that war by a major power to protect or to interfere with energy sup-
plies would coincide with, or inaugurate, a period of sharply declining perform-
ance by the world economy, a development whose effects would be felt by the 
states immediately concerned, and also by potential opponents, collaborators, 
and by-standers. In general, the militarization of energy security needs to be 
envisioned as occurring within a context of strategic anxiety and severe eco-
nomic stress, in which economic productivity is far below what people are used 
to, and in which the perennial peacetime trade-offs between guns and butter had 
become correspondingly more contentious. Such conditions have arisen before, 
in the 1930s, when the developed world's demand for security increased rapidly, 
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under conditions that made the relative social cost of that security· extremely 
expensive. It remains difficult to this day to see how war could have been 
avoided under such circumstances. 
The relationship between spiraling energy costs and global stability - social, 
political, and strategic - are not easy to anticipate in detail. On the whole it is 
reasonable to assume that the West and the rest of the developed world will be 
in the best position to afford higher costs. But they may also be the most suscep-
tible to the pressure of public opinion and powerful economic interests. They 
also possess the most formidable military resources with which to intervene in 
the market, should they wish to do so. Developing states that are consumers of 
oil probably have the least leverage in market terms; but this may only make 
them more willing to choose the military option in moments of desperation. 
Such states are often disconnected from, and even hostile to, those features of 
economic globalization that are driving growth and development elsewhere, and 
may feel that they have little to lose in challenging a system that is failing them 
in any case. Oil-producing states can benefit from high prices only as long as 
demand does not collapse, or become translated into calls for direct action 
outside the boundaries of the market. In the latter case they can be expected to 
seek the protection of more powerful consumer states. Indeed, the emergence of 
such relationships, in anticipation of a deteriorating energy market, is one of the 
more likely ways in which the militarization of energy security may unfold. 
A state that chose a militarized energy strategy would of course need to con-
sider that other states might gang up against it, and that it might risk being 
excluded from other markets in which it might have preferred to continue to 
participate. Nothing of strategic significance that happens in the world of energy 
can realistically be considered without simultaneous reference to the workings 
of global financial markets, a realm in which the United States occupies a posi-
tion comparable to that of the Middle East with respect to oil. States need energy 
not for its own sake, but in order to be able to make things to consume and to 
sell. This means they also need customers, investors, and creditors, all of whose 
reactions must be taken into account in order to obtain a complete strategic 
picture of what the militarization of energy security would entail. 
The strategic complexity that surrounds the problem of energy security arises 
mainly from the need to understand these second-order interactions, whose 
daunting appearance is not an illusion. The militarization of energy resources 
would involve a general retreat from "globalization," a process whose inexora-
bility is too readily taken for granted by policy-makers. The dynamics of global-
ization are routinely characterized as tending to diminish the influence of states, 
whose preeminence as shapers of the international order is being reduced by the 
rising power of multinational corporations, global financial and commodities 
markets, new information technologies, and so on. It is important to recognize, 
however, that the basic enabling conditions that allow these institutions and 
processes to operate - enforceable contracts, liquid currencies, and the physical 
security of the great global commons (air, sea, and space) - are created and 
maintained by governments. While states may not have the means to control all 
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the results of the processes that they have enabled, they most certainly have the 
means to bring those processes to an end by withdrawing the juridical and secur-
ity guarantees that make them possible. 
Energy security and the "war on terror" 
The international energy market has always rested on the possibility that major 
market participants might be required to use force to defend or manage its oper-
ation. The prospect was made plain even before the end of World War II, when 
Franklin Roosevelt took it upon himself to guarantee the territorial integrity of 
Saudi Arabia, by way of securing its cooperation in the orderly production of oil 
in line with American requirements.9 The energy market has never been immune 
to political and strategic influence. Oil has been used as a "weapon" in the past, 
and its price (along with that of natural gas) is reflective of a range of political 
pressures to which a perfectly efficient, strategically agnostic market would be 
indifferent. Nevertheless, the un-coerced, non-violent interaction of buyers and 
sellers has been the primary determinant of how energy resources have been 
produced and consumed throughout the period when those resources have traded 
freely in global markets - roughly since the final unraveling of European 
empires, and the emergence of the United States as a net importer of oil. If this 
situation were to change, such that the strategic interactions of governments and 
other contestants for political power were to prevail over the commercial inter-
actions of buyers and sellers, a great deal else would change as well. 
It is thus reasonable to ask who, among present-day occupants of the inter-
national stage, would like to see a great deal changed? to which the immediate 
answer would obviously be the ramshackle assemblage of rogue states and revo-
lutionary movements whose machinations consume such a disproportionate 
share of time and attention from the defense establishments of the world. As 
noted earlier, energy security looms large in the strategic planning of advanced 
societies in part because, to the extent that it holds out some prospect for the 
resumption of major interstate war, its requirements make it easier to justify 
cherished force structures and budgets. Yet military planners and civilian strate-
gists are also inclined to point to the potential threat that terrorists and other dis-
enfranchised groups pose to global energy markets; and indeed they have good 
reason to do so. 
That terrorists and their ilk are interested in attacking energy-related targets is 
hard to dispute. A review of data compiled by the National Memorial Institute 
for the Prevention of Terrorism, or MIPT, indicates that terrorist groups 
mounted at least 330 attacks against oil and gas facilities around the world 
during the period 1990-2005. 10 Most of these incidents occurred in eight coun-
tries: Iraq, Russia, Colombia, Ecuador, Philippines, Turkey, Pakistan, and 
Algeria. Since the American invasion of Iraq insurgents have systematically 
attacked the country's oil export terminal at Basra, various oil pipelines travers-
ing Iraq, and the electrical power grid. These actions have been a serious com-
plicating factor in restoring Iraqi oil production to its pre-war level. 11 
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The congruence between terrorist stomping grounds and the worid's major 
energy-producing regions is apparent. The world's most celebrated international 
renegade, Osama bin Laden, casts the West's consumption of Persian Gulf 
energy as a central part of a complicated narrative that features the plundering of 
the Middle East's riches. 12 In a videotape released on the fifth anniversary of the 
September 2001 attacks, his deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri repeated accusations 
that the West is stealing Muslim oil, and called for stepped-up attacks in the 
Gulf.13 
Islamist insurgents appear to have taken these calls at least somewhat to 
heart, and have mounted episodic attacks against energy targets. In the summer 
of 2002, Saudi authorities arrested a group of militants plotting to sabotage the 
Saudi offshore oil terminal (the largest in the world) at Ras Tanura. 14 Later that 
year, in October 2002, the French supertanker Limburg was rammed off the 
coast of Yemen by a small boat loaded with explosives. 15 In April 2004 Iraqi 
insurgents attacked Iraqi oil terminals at Khor al-Amaya and Basra and shut 
down the terminals for two days. 16 In February 2006, the Saudis thwarted an 
attack on the oil-processing facility at Abqaiq and later seized 1.5 tons of explo-
sives that were to have been used in additional attacks on oil facilities. 17 In Sep-
tember 2006 security officials in Yemen successfully prevented attacks against 
oil installations at the port of Dubba and the refinery at Mareb. 18 In the fall of 
2006, the Royal Navy released a warning to all merchant vessels in the Gulf to 
be on the alert for suspicious activities. 19 
It is an alarming picture; yet the consequences of all these actions combined 
have barely ruffled the consciousness of world opinion, because their material 
effects have been so small. Nor are the motives that would lead terrorists to 
choose such targets necessarily easy to discern. In this connection it is worth dis-
tinguishing between the motives of revolutionary insurgents seeking to over-
throw a particular government, for whom attacks on energy infrastructure may 
make perfect sense in instrumental terms, and those who wish somehow to 
direct hammer blows against the inequity of the world system as a whole. It is 
the latter group whom men like bin Laden and al-Zawahiri purport to lead, and 
for them the energy sector presents a puzzle. 
To the extent that terrorists operate according to the same kind of instrumen-
tal rationality that motivates other strategic actors,20 their reasons to attack 
energy assets would presumably be to inflict harm on their adversaries, and to 
draw attention to their cause by way of demonstrating competence and attracting 
recruits. In the energy arena these things can be accomplished in two general 
ways: by attacking major oil-production and refining nodes; or by disrupting the 
transportation of oil through critical chokepoints like the Strait of Hormuz and 
the Bab el Mandeb, or (more plausibly) via the network of oil and natural-gas 
pipelines throughout the Middle East and Central Asia. Both are possible, but 
both also present serious obstacles if the aim is to achieve sustained, strategic-
level effects that would disrupt the functioning of global energy markets. 
The impact of terrorist attacks on energy targets has been negligible until 
now. While the (unsuccessful) Qaeda attack on the Saudi oil-refining facility at 
r 
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Abqaiq in February 2006 resulted in a $2-per-barrel price increase overnight, the 
market soon recovered its equilibrium.21 Despite repeated attacks in South 
America by various groups on energy targets in Colombia, Venezuela, and 
Ecuador, markets have had little difficulty dealing with the resulting short-term 
perturbations. It also goes without saying that producing states take the security 
of their single most valuable asset quite seriously. The Saudi refining complex at 
Abqaiq and its export terminal at Ras Tanura are said to be among the best-
defended civilian facilities in the world. 
By some lights the formidable nature of such places might be a reason to 
attack them.22 A successful attack against a "hard" target like Abqaiq would test 
the operational limits of a group like al-Qaeda, but it would pay off dramatically 
in increased prestige, both in general and among the disenfranchised Muslim 
youth who constitute its main recruiting base. It could also set in motion exces-
sively violent or otherwise self-defeating reactions among oil-consuming states, 
which the perpetrators might be able to exploit to their advantage, assuming they 
were not destroyed in the process. Yet a failure would be no less conspicuous, 
and while it may be true that there is no such thing as bad publicity, a moment 
comes when even the most unconventional strategic actor must be able to show 
that it can connect actions and results in some meaningful way. 
The energy sector offers a vast array of "soft" targets too, of course, above all 
the pipelines by which oil and gas are moved from production sites to refineries 
and export terminals. In physical terms much of this system is simply indefensi-
ble, and attacks upon it have been frequent as a consequence. Yet the global 
market impact that can be achieved by blows of this kind is limited and tran-
sient. The oil-pipeline system of the Middle East, in particular, was built with 
security in mind. The threat it was designed to counter was not terrorism, but the 
treachery of neighboring governments, whose willingness to allow someone 
else's oil to flow through their territories without interference could never be 
taken for granted. Yet the resulting infrastructural redundancy serves equally 
well to mitigate the effects of terrorist attacks. If anything, the use of oil and gas 
pipelines as instruments of strategic coercion is better suited to governments 
than to international outlaws.23 
From a terrorist's perspective, then, the energy sector presents a complex set 
of problems and opportunities. The efficiency of global energy markets and the 
redundancy of global infrastructure make the sector relatively resilient to the 
disruptive effects of all but the most apocalyptic physical attack. The air travel 
industry has taken years to recover from the psychological effects of the 2001 
attacks on its customers. It is difficult to imagine an attack on a comparable 
scale having anything like a comparable effect on the energy sector. It is one 
thing to get people to reconsider their travel plans, another to get them to recon-
sider driving to work or heating their houses. Nevertheless, despite the difficulty 
of achieving strategic-level impacts on global markets, it would be a mistake to 
dismiss the threat out of hand. Saudi Arabia is a particularly attractive candidate 
for a sustained effort of disruption, because it boasts much of the world's excess 
oil-production capacity, the existence of which is critical to the management of 
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oil prices. The consequences of a nuclear or radiological attack on a major Saudi 
facility might well achieve effects of broad and enduring consequence, by virtue 
of the anxiety it might inspire, or by destabilizing the Saudi regime itself, whose 
radicalization or overthrow would pose considerable risks to the system as a 
whole. 
Globally significant conflict could also arise over the actions of non-state 
groups with close ties to oil-producing states, whether acting as proxies or 
simply with their support. The Hezbollah-Iranian relationship is a case in point. 
It is by no means impossible to imagine that a regional war started by Hezbollah 
or Israel might lead to Israel (or even the United States) targeting Iranian energy 
facilities, the revenue from which is part of the foundation of Hezbollah 's exist-
ence.24 Such a scenario merely reinforces the point made earlier, however, that 
the path to strategic disruption of global energy markets, for terrorists or anyone 
else, lies through the actions of the market's strongest participants. Such lever-
age as terrorists may gain in this area is entirely dependent on their ability to 
anticipate correctly the psychological and political reactions of their adversaries. 
War for the market 
The militarization of energy-resource management poses special problems for 
the United States, whose national interest is strongly identified with the preser-
vation of market-based access to energy. Much is made of American depen-
dence on "foreign oil," and on the sensitivity of American domestic opinion to 
high oil prices. In the final analysis, however, America's fundamental interest is 
not in the maintenance of oil prices at a given level, nor in buying oil produced 
in a given region. It is in the maintenance of the global market mechanism by 
which the price is set. For the United States the question is not whether the 
market can be trusted. It is whether, and how, it can be defended, should it 
require defense. No country is more ideologically committed to the idea of "the 
market" as the ultimate arbiter of how goods and services are distributed. Prices 
and supplies that rise and fall, however sharply, in response to the realities of 
supply and demand cannot in themselves pose a threat to America's Jong-term 
interest. But the possibility that the price and supply of energy may become 
subject to strategic pressure, disconnected from the demands of the marketplace, 
is something to which the United States can be expected to react in strategic 
terms. A harbinger of what such a reaction might entail was provided by Presid-
ent Carter, who declared in January 1980 that Soviet penetration of the Persian 
Gulf would be met by force, up to and including the use of nuclear weapons.25 
International markets have always been sustained indirectly by the armed 
forces of major participants, above all by the great maritime powers (first 
Britain, now the United States), whose interest in the expansion of global com-
merce was and is backed by armed forces that secure an essential piece of the 
system: free transit of goods across the high seas. But the beneficial effects of 
such forces are best exemplified by those long historical periods when they have 
not been required to act too frequently. Such forces play the same role interna-
r 
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tionally that police forces play in relation to domestic markets: their presence 
reduces interference by non-market actors to manageable levels. If the New 
York City Police were ever to burst, guns blazing, onto the floor of the New 
York Stock Exchange, the effect on the market would not be reassuring. If such 
things were to happen on a regular basis, the functioning of the market as such 
would be cast into doubt. The same sort of circular conundrum operates interna-
tionally: the overt use of force to protect market practices, if done persistently 
and on a sufficient scale, runs the risk of demolishing what it seeks to build up. 
The question of how an institution that forswears violence can be defended 
by force immediately presents the problem of how such operations can be 
crafted so as to make their strategic purpose clear. A military operation that 
seizes control of energy assets or transit systems in order to ensure that they are 
not removed from the marketplace is not easily distinguishable from one 
intended to improve America's own energy security by military means.26 The 
suspicions that such an action would inspire are easy to anticipate. Many of the 
major participants in the global energy market are not ideologically committed 
to markets as such, nor to the promotion of economic freedom among their own 
populations. Such states are unlikely to lend much credence to American claims 
that it is acting in the interest of international order and the general good. The 
picture is further complicated by the fact that the United States is, in both per 
capita and absolute terms, the largest consumer of energy on the planet. This 
raises the suspicion that American military action in the energy arena will have 
no other purpose than to defend a pattern of consumption that much of the rest 
of the world already resents. 
These kinds of considerations suggest that, in the energy sphere as in all 
others, the successful application of military force will depend on how it is 
framed in political terms. Force exercised within the context of international Jaw 
- in whose further development the United States has a strong, if lately dormant, 
interest - or at any rate with the blessing and support of major market particip-
ants, is manifestly preferable to unilateral action, whose self-interested motives 
are liable to be taken for granted even by friendly by-standers. Unilateral pol-
icies are especially ill suited to an arena in which effective action will almost 
certainly require the synchronization of military and economic pressure. Sanc-
tions regimes, boycotts, restrictions on the transfer of technology, and so on, are 
all difficult to employ by any state acting alone. A militarized energy strategy 
could scarcely be undertaken without imposing much higher prices, and corre-
spondingly reduced consumption, on the American public. That being the case, 
efforts to reduce consumption in advance of a crisis might well be strategically 
advisable. Doing so would help to insulate the American economy from the 
negative effects of its own strategic behavior. A country that has demonstrated 
strong consciousness of the need to conserve energy resources is also more 
likely to be perceived as an honest policeman by other market participants. 
It is also apparent that military intervention to defend the operation of the 
global energy market, even if successful, harmonizes imperfectly with American 
policies oriented toward the spread of democratic institutions in parts of the 
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world where these are currently unknown. In the broadest terms the picture is 
natural enough, since there is no question that the most reliable participants in 
any international market are going to be democratic states presiding over a free 
citizenry. In the short run and in practice, however, the attempt to bring such 
conditions about by strategic means - that is, by the calculated use or threat of 
force - is certain to introduce additional instability and risk into the international 
system. As recent experience in the Middle East has demonstrated, it is not easy 
to stabilize a region and to transform it at the same time. To choose trans-
formation is to choose instability, the price of which may be judged quite high in 
the marketplace. 
Any state that is committed to defend international markets in their current 
form must face the unpleasant necessity of accepting other, less attractive 
aspects of the international status quo, including the prominent role of market 
participants whose values and outlook may be deeply disturbing in other con-
texts. Failure to do so risks setting in motion precisely the kind of spiraling 
movement away from the market that the US wishes to avoid. In the same way 
that it is not easy to choose both transformation and stability, it is not easy to be 
both policeman and revolutionary. These are no more than the perennial puzzles 
that have attended American foreign policy since it first achieved something like 
its present form, at the tum of the twentieth century. It is merely that, as applied 
to the problems of energy security, the consequences of misjudgment become 
that much more severe. Misjudgments by buyers and sellers may eventually be 
redeemed by "reversion to the mean," but in the strategic arena mistakes can 
acquire a kind of finality unknown to other forms of public life. All the more 
reason to think carefully before embarking on bold initiatives, from which there 
may be no meaningful retreat. 
Prospects and possibilities 
The chapters that follow cover the issues described above from a variety of per-
spectives, some regional, some global and systemic. As will be obvious, they 
represent no established consensus, except on the basic proposition that strategic 
risks in the energy sector are sufficiently serious to bear sustained consideration 
from policy-makers. None regards the militarization of energy as an imminent 
threat, though some consider it a less remote possibility than others. All empha-
size the salience of American power to the management of the present system. 
Some are more confident about how long present arrangements can continue, 
however, while others are more sensitive to the risks and costs that the actual 
use of force by the United States might entail. 
Daniel Moran's chapter considers the broader historical context out of which 
current conditions have arisen. While those conditions are new and distinctive in 
important respects, it is still possible to find earlier episodes that shed a useful 
light on the interaction between economic interests and strategic action, which 
have sometimes fallen disastrously foul of each other in ways that bear thinking 
about. 
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Michael Klare's chapter surveys the current state of global energy politics, 
with emphasis on the rising pessimism of recent years. His aim, as he says, is to 
explain the "growing worldwide inclination to contemplate military force to 
ensure the safe production and transportation of oil supplies"; a question he 
answers with reference to three general factors: an anticipated insufficiency of 
petroleum, heightened competition for what is left, and a relative shi!'t ~f avail-
able energy supplies toward unstable parts of the world. The pess1m1sm that 
Klare points to is also implicated in Peter Haynes's discussion of the motives 
that may lead organizations like al-Qaeda to target global energy resources, irre-
spective of the instrumental logic and operational difficulty of doing so. Like 
Klare, Haynes is particularly sensitive to the psychological dimensions of the 
energy issue, an arena in which strategic decisions are likely to be governed less 
by immediate material circumstances than by rival images of the future. 
The chapters by Duane Chapman and Saad Rahim are both concerned with 
what Rahim calls the "energy architecture" of the Persian Gulf, and with the role 
of the United States in sustaining it. Chapman surveys the mechanisms by which 
oil-price stability has been maintained in the past, and considers what sort of inter-
national regime might be required to achieve comparable results in the future. 
Rahim emphasizes that global energy security is critically dependent on the polit-
ical stability of the Gulf States themselves, a subject about which he finds some 
cause for optimism, while noting the considerable perils that may yet arise from 
the turmoil in Iraq and the revolutionary aspirations prevailing in Tehran. 
Iran also figures in the work of Amy Myers Jaffe and Ronald Soligo, albeit 
chiefly as a cat's-paw and ally of Russia. Among militarily powerful participants 
in the world energy market, Russia is the least fully integrated into the global 
economy as a whole. It is accordingly the one that may be most inclined to view 
its market position as a direct source of strategic leverage. Jaffe and Soligo show 
that the historical track record of those who have sought to wield the "energy 
weapon" is not good. They also note that the resilience of the system has not 
been fully tested in this regard since the end of the Cold War, during which 
superpower rivalry may have limited the options of lesser states in ways that no 
longer apply. 
One source of Russian strategic leverage is the sway it exercises over the 
states of Central Asia, largely owing to the legacy of pipeline infrastructure 
created when the region was part of the former Soviet Union. Thomas Johnson 
surveys the energy politics of the region. He emphasizes the limited alternatives 
that governments there face in managing their "Faustian bargain" with Moscow, 
whose influence has proven an obstacle to both democratic reform and economic 
diversification. Christopher Soucek focuses on the recent transition of power in 
Turkmenistan, which he judges to have presented some risks to continued 
Russian preponderance, which Moscow has navigated successfully so far. 
Boucek's portrayal of the regime of the late lamented Turkmenbashi neverthe-
less testifies to the political immaturity of the region as a whole, in which, as he 
concludes, ingrained Russian hegemony may yet give way to "overt imperial 
meddling" if Moscow is to continue to have its way. 
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Harold Trinkunas considers the not-altogether-different case of Venezuela, a 
traditionally pro-Western country whose current president, Hugo Chavez, is 
struggling to escape from what he regards as the baleful hegemony of the United 
States. Like the new states of Central Asia, Venezuela suffers from a combina-
tion of limited market options and limited military resources, for which its 
current leader has sought to compensate by seeking ideological leadership of 
those producer states who would like to see America's global influence dimin-
ished. Although the rhetoric of the Chavez regime portrays Venezuelan oil as a 
weapon with which to advance and defend his "Bolivarian revolution," the 
underlying reality, as Trinkunas shows, is that of a state whose worst enemy 
(and best customer) has little reason to wish it harm. 
The volume concludes with two chapters on the new economies of rising 
Asia, whose recent performance has vaulted them to the center of the global 
energy picture. Jacqueline Newmyer's discussion focuses on China, the largest 
Asian nation and the one whose economic and strategic trajectory will go a long 
way toward determining the future of the entire region. Newmyer considers the 
challenges that China's dynamic economy poses for its political leadership, still 
drawn exclusively from a single political party whose founding ideology is 
deeply inimical to the values of the marketplace. Although she detects little 
interest or willingness to tum back the clock on the part of China's current 
leaders, the range of choices they face going forward includes several that would 
place prevailing market mechanisms at risk, along with the future prosperity of 
China itself. 
Flynt Leverett's chapter considers Chinese energy strategy, and that of other 
major Asian states, within the broader framework of "resource mercantilism," 
by which consumers of energy seek privileged access to resources by means that 
subvert or bypass market mechanisms. Leverett argues that under present cir-
cumstances concerns of this kind are overdrawn, and that the principal risk 
arising from them stems from misunderstanding or over-reaction by the United 
States. Nevertheless, mercantilism in any form tends to blur the line between the 
realms of commerce and force. If persisted in beyond current limits and per-
ceived intentions, such policies would inexorably move the world economy back 
toward the kind of conditions that prevailed in the first half of the twentieth 
century, when war to secure economic advantage was a far more familiar and 
natural idea than it is today. 
Notes 
Since the end of the Cold War the unlikelihood of conflict among advanced societies 
has been a prominent theme of the policy documents known as the "National Security 
Strategy of the United States," an annual series produced under the mandate of the 
Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. The most 
recent such statement can be found at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/. The 
reports on "National Military Strategy," also mandated to appear annually, have 
lagged somewhat in their willingness to shift the focus away from conventional 
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and the Rhythm of Hist01y, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996, especially pp. 
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Arabia, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006, pp. 36-60. 
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1 The battlefield and the 
marketplace 
Two cautionary tales 
Daniel Moran 
Contemporary discussions of energy security are bounded by complex and 
inconsistent assumptions about the relationship between war and international 
commerce. The most important is the belief that the growth of international 
trade has a stabilizing and pacifying effect on international relations. This 
outlook has a long history, briefly surveyed below. It also has the additional val-
idation of having underlain American foreign policy throughout its tenure as a 
major actor on the international stage. Although there have always been those 
who have held that rivalries originating in the marketplace might easily bleed 
over into the battlefield, such episodes, when they have occurred, have come to 
be regarded as symptomatic of political under-development, or as irrational 
attempts to swim against the tide of history. This historical picture is widely 
regarded as reassuring. 
The integrative and pacifying effect of global markets is now held in such 
high regard that it is deemed to operate independently of the ideological convic-
tions of governments. This is especially true in the energy arena, in which profits 
are so large, and security of access so essential, that neither buyers nor sellers 
are thought likely to sacrifice their market position on behalf of other interests, 
at least not for long. This proposition is sometimes boiled down to the claim, 
widely bruited in the run-up to the American-led ejection of Iraq from Kuwait in 
1991, that it does not matter which (or what kinds of) governments control 
energy resources, because whoever they are, and however reprehensible they 
may be in other respects, they must sell it to the rest of us in the end, or else go 
hungry. 
These beliefs exist uneasily with another, however, the idea that economic 
sanctions, boycotts, and so on are useful and broadly acceptable tools of inter-
national coercion. Such measures are presumed to be more humane and less 
dangerous than the actual use of force, while being capable of achieving similar 
results. Their ostensibly non-violent character has caused them to be held in 
particular regard by market-oriented liberal democracies. Jn their own way such 
measures also testify to the respect that the power of the market now commands. 
Yet the use of economic pressure as a substitute for war inevitably blurs the line 
between them, and casts doubt on the claim that the natural consequence of 
market integration is peace. When states use trade strategically, in lieu of force, 
